I analyse Thatcherism as an ensemble of strategies directly targeting class relations, which form part of a broader neoliberal regime of condensation. To show the value-added of this approach, I will first of all describe the historical context of Thatcherism, and show how a deep economic, political, and ideological crisis prepared the ground for a profound ideological shift in the Conservative Party, which consisted in various elements of neoliberal ideology beginning to dominate the party discourse.
erogeneity and had resulted in the emergence of economic apparatuses with only limited interventionist capacities.4
In the field of economic order politics, political leaders grappled with corresponding problems. Initially, the early post-war governments appeared successful insofar as they managed to establish an economic-political order that combined a Keynesian accumulation strategy with an interventionist state strategy. However, they failed to instigate the restructuring of the British industrial base, whose 'competitiveness' had been eroding since the second wave of industrialisation in the late nineteenth century:5 on the whole, there were only sluggish increases in productivity and economic growth.
This was further aggravated by the incapacity of corporatist institutions to enforce wage restraint. Under the conditions of limited growth, substantial wage increases posed a threat to profits. In this situation, employers resorted to fending off this threat by increasing prices, which stoked inflation and restricted the growth of real wages.6 At the macro-level, this resulted in a cycle of stagnation, which usually followed a 'boom and bust' pattern: first, there was a brief phase of expansion; next, inflationary pressures emerged and the balance of payments started deteriorating; this then resulted in a currency crisis and, finally, in a contraction.
The application of inconsistent political techniques of economic crisis management complicated the macroeconomic issues. On the one hand, successive governments committed themselves to Keynesian demand management; on the other hand, they stuck to orthodox ways of stabilising the pound: they chose to react to the recurring currency crises with ad-hoc cutbacks in state expenditure, which stabilised the pound but undercut demand. Once stabilisation had been achieved, they reflated, which created new inflationary pressures. In other words, the application of Keynesian techniques had a pro-cyclical, not an anticyclical effect. Under these conditions, Britain never saw the emergence of a self-reinforcing productivist growth dynamic as witnessed in France and West Germany at the time. In light of this, Jessop speaks of 'Britain's flawed Fordism' .7
The shortcomings of post-war strategies in the field of economic order politics not only reflected the weakness of corporatist institutions. The fact that the dominant fraction of the power bloc, the City, did not have an interest in the resurgence of its industrial counterpart further compounded difficulties, as did
